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Case Study

AI Security Evaluation & Assurance

Independent assessment of production AI systems: adversarial testing, privacy review, severity-rated findings, and fix verification criteria that produce decision-grade evidence for audit and governance.

AIUC-1 Consortium whitepaper: Defending at Machine Speed, After Mythos (co-author)
AI Security Evaluation & Assurance

Executive Outcome

01

Delivered a severity-rated assessment across security, reliability, grounding, privacy, and responsible AI — backed by reproducible test cases, not just a narrative report.

02

Handed over a prioritized remediation plan that mapped every finding to a control, an owner, and a verification criterion.

03

The assessment methodology itself became reusable — versioned test packs and evidence formats cut setup time noticeably on every system that came after the first.

Engagement focus

Reusable assessment methodology for production AI, adversarial testing, privacy review, severity-rated findings, and evidence formats designed for audit sampling across multiple systems.

What this covers
  • Adversarial testing (prompt injection, exfiltration, tool misuse, denial-of-wallet)
  • Privacy, data boundaries, and retrieval permission enforcement
  • Gateway and runtime controls (tool permissions, identity scope, traceability, rollback readiness)

Context

Production AI systems carry a combined risk surface across model behavior, retrieval, tool execution, and operational controls. In a regulated environment, stakeholders can't just take design intent on faith — they need an independent assessment of what the system actually does under real usage, under adversarial pressure, and as it changes over time. The output has to be decision-grade: what can ship, under which constraints, with what residual risk, and how a fix actually gets verified. Because these assessments needed to repeat across multiple systems and teams, I built the methodology to be reusable too — versioned test packs, a consistent severity model, evidence formats that hold up for audit sampling without getting rebuilt from scratch each time.

The Challenge

  • 01The security exposure wasn't well understood across the key abuse cases — prompt injection, data exfiltration, unauthorized retrieval, tool misuse — under realistic adversarial input.
  • 02Privacy and data handling controls were unclear in practice: sensitive data detection, retention, and whether logs and traces were quietly introducing new exposure of their own.
  • 03Grounding quality and reliability varied a lot scenario to scenario, with inconsistent citations and behavior that wasn't repeatable.
  • 04Responsible AI controls were documented, but not consistently testable, versioned, or evidenced — good on paper, unproven in practice.
  • 05Every change — model, prompt, retrieval, policy — risked a silent regression, with no repeatable way to quantify the impact or prove a fix actually worked.

Approach

  • →Threat-modeled system boundaries, data flows, identities, tools, and trust boundaries, then built an assessment plan around test categories and evidence requirements.
  • →Built a severity model and risk-rating criteria aligned to enterprise risk appetite and the scale of the change being assessed.
  • →Ran adversarial security testing: prompt injection, jailbreak, data exfiltration, unauthorized retrieval, privilege escalation through tools, denial-of-wallet.
  • →Assessed the retrieval and data boundary directly — eligibility enforcement, sensitive source handling, citation requirements, and traceability from query to retrieved chunk.
  • →Reviewed privacy in runtime and observability — PII and secrets exposure, redaction controls, retention rules, and whether traces stayed joinable for investigations without over-collecting.
  • →Built an evaluation plan and offline plus regression test suites for reliability, grounding, and safety, with versioned datasets, thresholds, and drift tracking.
  • →Checked tool-use correctness and side-effect controls — schema validity, scope boundaries, approval paths, safe failure behavior.
  • →Delivered severity-rated findings with evidence and reproduction steps, then re-tested fixes to confirm they actually closed and what residual risk was left.

Key Considerations

  • The assessment's credibility rests entirely on reproducibility — test cases, datasets, and scoring all had to be versioned or the results stop being comparable over time.
  • LLM-assisted scoring improves consistency, but it needs calibration and drift monitoring, paired with deterministic checks — it can't be the only signal.
  • Traces have to support investigation and audit sampling while still respecting privacy, retention, and access restrictions — those two goals pull against each other.
  • One assessment gives you a defensible baseline, not an ongoing governance program. Keeping pace with change afterward is a separate piece of work.

Alternatives Considered

  • ✕A checklist-only review doesn't validate how the system actually behaves under adversarial pressure — it validates that a document got filled in.
  • ✕Waiting for production to surface issues carries risk that's hard to justify, and the evidence you get from it is weak.
  • ✕Manual QA alone doesn't scale to non-determinism, variance across contexts, or a threat model that keeps moving.
Representative Artifacts
01Assessment Plan and System Boundary Definition
02Threat Model and Attack Surface Map
03Adversarial Security Test Report (attack catalog, test cases, evidence, severity ratings)
04Privacy and Data Handling Review
05Reliability and Grounding Validation Suite (scenarios, scoring, thresholds, drift tracking)
06Tool Use and Side-Effect Controls Review
07Findings Register and Remediation Plan (owners, timelines, verification criteria, residual risk)
08Assessment Dossier for Audit Sampling (evidence index, traces, decision records)
Acceptance Criteria

Severity-rated findings register with evidence, reproduction steps, and recommended remediation per finding.

Threat model exists and adversarial test coverage maps to identified abuse cases and trust boundary risks.

Critical and high findings have owners, target dates, and verification criteria; fixes re-tested with closure evidence.

Adversarial testing demonstrates that unauthorized retrieval, exfiltration, and tool misuse are prevented or detected.

Privacy controls validated for runtime behavior, logging retention, and observability access.

Reliability and safety meet defined thresholds; regression coverage established for high-risk change classes.

Assessment dossier complete and sampling-ready with consistent evidence index and control mapping.

Assessment Packs
DatasetKindTarget
RAG Grounding & Citation PackbaselineMeasure faithfulness, grounding quality, and citation coverage.
Policy Compliance & Refusal Packrelease regressionVerify refusal behavior for restricted intents and policy constraints.
Tool-Use Correctness PackbaselineValidate tool selection, argument correctness, and permission boundaries.
Adversarial Prompt Injection Packred teamDetect susceptibility to prompt injection and jailbreak attempts.
Voice Interaction PackvoiceEvaluate call flows, intent detection, and safety behavior.
Sensitive Data Exposure Packred teamDetect PII, secrets leakage, and redaction failures across inputs, retrieval, and outputs.
Observability and Trace Joinability Packaudit evidenceVerify traces support investigation and sampling without over collection or broken joins.
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